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BOOK REVIEW
LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE. By Thomas L. Shaffer and
Robert S. Redmount. Colorado Springs, Colorado: Shepard's Inc.,
1977. Pp. 252 (soft cover). $7.95.
REVIEWED BY GENE R. SHREVE*
A law professor and former dean of a prestigious American law school
told me recently that he found Shaffer and Redmount's book disap-
pointing. "They make us all out to be Kingsfields," he said. Kingsfield
was a vicious and domineering law professor in John Osborn's fiction-
alized account of student life at Harvard Law School, The Paper Chase.
Actually, Shaffer and Redmount go to considerable pains in their book
to point out that very few Kingsfields are extant in American law
schools. The failure of my professor friend to grasp so rudimentary a
point in the book suggests that written criticism of legal education is
taken rather casually by representatives of the law school establish-
ment-the authors are highly critical of American legal education.
Their criticism is challenging and succinct, but, if they had confined
themselves to criticism alone, they would have accomplished little.
What makes the book remarkable is that the authors describe in a
thoughtful and convincing manner some of the processes by which le-
gal education may be functionally defined. Through their research and
interpretation of data, the authors demonstrate how available strengths
in legal education go unexploited and how obstacles to learning go un-
checked.
The authors' criticism of legal education is contained in the fol-
lowing premises. First, humanism is an important quality in lawyering.
Second, most lawyers are not humanistic enough. Third, vital and per-
ishable opportunities to teach humanistic values and to integrate hu-
manistic methodologies into problem solving are overlooked by law
schools.
* Associate Professor, Vermont Law School. LL.B. 1968, LL.M. 1975, Harvard Univer-
sity.
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The book suggests that lawyers must be willing and able to re-
spond to the human needs of their clients. Professional responsibility
must include acknowledgement of
the fact that most lawyers in practice are ministers to the needs of
human beings. They deal with hurt and threat and expectation and
desire. They are expected to be reasonably concerned and personally
helpful in dealing with their clients. In effect, this becomes definition
for what is meant by the humanistic orientation or humanistic dispo-
sition of lawyers. 1
Few may disagree with the authors' first two premises. Humanis-
tic values are important but neglected in the practice of law. Lawyers
too often function as a warrior elite of intellectual technicians, dealing
with the legal issues represented by their clients rather than with the
clients themselves. Skills of analysis and persuasion are venerated and
are not infrequently employed as foils against the lawyer's own client.
Lawyers are often ignorant of values and methodologies important to
skills of counseling and mediation. They are often contemptuous of
knowledge provided by the social sciences even though it is relevant to
their clients' needs.
The book is centered on the authors' third and most controversial
premises. The first chapter is a polemic against the failure of American
law schools to provide a humanistic learning experience. Shaffer and
Redmount contend that teachers are pre-occupied with the refinement
of intellectual skills. Training that prepares students for the interper-
sonal demands of lawyering is minimal or nonexistent. The reluctance
of teachers to share control of classroom activity and the refusal of
teachers to recognize and respond to the human needs of their students
result, according to the authors, in a kind of negative behavioral train-
ing. Students who become lawyers treat their clients with similar dis-
dain.'
The topic has seldom been treated with such verve and eloquence,
but the criticism is not new.2 There is no reason to believe that criti-
1. T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 107 (1977).
2. The particular manner in which law school shortcomings are described may differ, but
many of the faults that the authors raise as deficiencies in humanistic orientation seem to have
been raised earlier by other writers. Kennedy, how the Law School Fals."A Polemic, YALE REV.
L. & Soc. AcT., Spring 1970, at 71; Mohr & Rodgers, LegalEducation: Some Student Reflections,
25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 403 (1973); Patton, The Student, the Situation and Peformance During the First
Year in Law School, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 10 (1968); Reich, Toward the Humanistic Study of Law,
74 YALE L.J. 1402 (1965); Sarason, Sarason, & Cowden, For Some Students Dying Begins with
Graduation, LAW & LEARNrNO, Fall 1974, at 44; Savoy, Towarda New Politics ofLegalEducation,
79 YALE L.J. 444 (1970); Watson, The Questfor Professional Competence. PsychologicalAspects of
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cism alone is more likely to lead to reform now than it has in the past.
Perhaps those in a position to change things are too stung to act on
recommendations contained in such criticisms; at least there are few
printed rejoinders.3 Critics are largely ignored, except by a few like-
minded individuals who can be innervated at the lack of progress indi-
cated by reading criticisms of American legal education that were made
ten years earlier 4
Next, Shaffer and. Redmount describe educational theorists' work
on how students learn. Illuminating summarizations of the findings of
Bruner, Piaget, Conant, and others are provided. The book contains a
valuable bibliography of writings on legal education and (more selec-
tively) on education in general and the social sciences. The authors are
undoubtedly correct in their assessment that few of us in law teaching
have sufficient "consciousness that learning is an intimate personal and
psychological experience."5 Attitudes in the learner that enhance or
block learning are detailed.
The book then proceeds to evaluate the literature on legal educa-
Legal Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 91 (1968); Zaremski, The First Year in Law Schook The
Intention Isto Make You FeelLess Than a Human Being, LAW & LEARNING, Summer 1973, at 51;
Note, Anxiety andthe First Semester ofLaw School, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 1201. The authors note the
extensive writing that has been undertaken, listing many of the above articles in the book's bibli-
ography.
Shaffer and Redmount produced considerable writing of their own on humanistic issues in
legal education prior to the publication of this book. See, e.g., Redmount, Attorney Personalities
andSome PsychologicalAspects ofLegal Consultation, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 972 (1961); Redmount,
A Clinical View ofLaw Teaching, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 705 (1975); Redmount, A Conceptual View of
the LegalEducation Process, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 129 (1972); Redmount, Humanistic Law Through
LegalEducation, 1 CONN. L. REv. 201 (1968); Shaffer, Collaboration in Studying Law, 25 J. LEGAL
EDuC. 239 (1973); Shaffer, Lawyers, Counselors and Counselors at Law, 61 A.B.A.J. 854 (1975). As
one might expect, the book has given the authors an opportunity to aggregate and to refine many
concepts from their earlier works. The tone taken by Shaffer and Redmount challenges tradi-
tional legal education more directly than that of their earlier works. Their methodology of per-
suasion is different in the book and (as discussed in this review) quite effective.
3. See, eg., Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARv. L. REv. 392 (1971).
4. The authors see a hegemony of vested law school interests as an obstacle to reform in
legal education.
The perpetuation of power is the first law of those who have it. Bar admission
committees, the Practorian Guard of the legal sanctum, insist even more than law profes-
sors that law school continues forms of learning that insure against change. Bar examin-
ers continue to test for information or legal analysis and leave professional competence
to chance. Law teachers have as their special pride and exultation a conceptualistic bril-
liance that boggles the mind. The teacher's intellect serves the power of the law, and that
is what learning the law is made to seem all about. An interlocking and self-perpetuat-
ing network is created between the lawyer, the institutional forms of law, the teacher,
and the student who inherits the system.
T. SHAFFER & PL REDMOUNT, supra note 1, at 11.
5. Id. at 28.
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tion. The authors' somewhat unexpected conclusions here establish the
purpose of the remainder of the book. Prestigious reports on legal edu-
cation by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education6 and the As-
sociation of American Law Schools7 largely fail to reflect the
humanistic concerns of Shaffer and Redmount and, not surprisingly,
draw their disapproval. More surprising is that the authors also dismiss
as speculative virtually all writings sympathetic to humanistic legal ed-
ucation.
The bias of the authors is clear. They write that they are "shame-
less evangelists for a particular point of view in legal education."8 But
the strategy of the authors may be to break the stalemate between hu-
manistic critics and the controllers of American legal education, even at
the risk of alienating the former, by transposing the discussion to a dif-
ferent and more productive level. The question the book poses for it-
self becomes: Can law school processes be discerned and evaluated
through research methodologies of the social sciences? Field work in
the law school community and the interpretation of data are integral
parts of the inquiry.
Undoubtedly, there are law school teachers and others who will
feel that they do not need empirical data to understand that students
must be taught in a manner that will enable them to serve their clients
with compassion and understanding as well as with intellectual skill, or
that even purely analytic learning by students will be enhanced if they
feel respected by their teachers rather than, degraded or ignored. But
law teachers stressing these values tend to work in isolation, often un-
noticed or unsupported by their own faculties. Such teachers may write
about their teaching, but, if the writings have any impact at all, it is
likely to be "because their authors have poetic insight which tends to
operate independent of their data."9 Teachers rarely write about obser-
vations of any classes other than their own and "[a]s long as the writer
is a teacher and is describing what he does in his own classes, he feels
little need to convince."' 0 The authors suggest that humanistic reform
in legal education has been blocked by a narrowness of thinking in
reformers and by their inability to persuade.
6. H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION (1972) (a report
prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education).
7. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSIONS
OF THE LAW, pt. I, § II (proceedings of 1971 annual meeting).
8. T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOuNT, supra note 1, at 59.
9. Id. at 50.
10. Id. at 54.
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The solution posed by Shaffer and Redmount is to add to the dia-
logue on humanistic reform a dimension of field investigation in the
law school community and interpretation of data which they call "ad-
vocacy research."" The process seems intended to lead those wishing
to examine humanistic issues in legal education to a more systematic
awareness of law school roles and the law school environment. The
authors appear to believe that humanistic values in legal education are
susceptible to verification. Through verification, the need and means
for change can be more readily demonstrated.
During a period from 1972 to 1973, the authors and their research
staff tested, interviewed, and evaluated a population composed of stu-
dents, faculty, and alumni from three Indiana law schools.12 The au-
thors investigated patterns of progression of humanistic learning from
the beginning of law study to practice. They examined backgrounds of
law students and their attitudes toward humanistic values. Finally,
they investigated law school teaching and a larger environment, which
the authors call the "law school climate,"' 3 in order to discover oppor-
tunities for and obstacles to humanistic learning. As the authors read-
ily acknowledge, their data are at times thin. But their topics, research
methodologies, and results are invariably interesting. I wil undertake
to summarize only a few of what seem to me to be the most thought-
provoking of the authors' findings and observations.
1. Law School May Leave Humanistic Values Untouched
Critics of legal education commonly view law school as a dehumaniz-
ing experience for students.' 4 To test this hypothesis, Shaffer and
Redmount gave first- and third-year students, faculty, and alumni an
identical set of three hypothetical problems. In each hypothetical, a
client visited the subject for advice regarding a different problem. For
each of the three cases, subjects were asked to rank in importance: (1) a
list of problem characterizations; (2) actions to be taken in response to
the interview; and (3) lawyering skills important to handling the case.
Responses were classified by the authors and their research staff as
"problem" or "person" oriented. All subject groups indicated approxi-
mately the same strong tendency toward "problem" rather than to
11. Id. at 59.
12. The authors summarize their data in the book. Statistical data have been collected in a
supplement to the book which may be obtained from the authors at a modest additional cost. A
description of the authors' test population appears therein. Id. at Table 1 supp.
13. Id. at 193.
14. See, eg., Kennedy, supra note 2, at 75-78.
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"person" orientation.'5 The authors expressed some surprise at the re-
suits. Certainly the data contradict the view that the law school experi-
ence is tangibly destructive to humanistic impulses. The authors,
however, suggest that this research demonstrates that law schools are
unsuccessful in refining and integrating humanistic values and that the
law school experience is, at best, irrelevant to humanistic growth.
2. Law SchoolAdmissions Policies Do Not Pose an Obstacle to
Humanistic Learning
Students are admitted to law school primarily on the basis of LSAT
scores, undergraduate class rank, or some combination of the two. Are
student bodies gathered on these bases sufficiently diverse and open to
humanistic learning to make reform meaningful without a basic change
in admissions policy? To examine this question, Shaffer and
Redmount compared humanistic test data of students within the au-
thors' research population on the basis of sex, family location, father's,
education, religion by birth, undergraduate class rank, graduate school
attendance, and LSAT scores. Their objectives appeared to be to deter-
mine ranges of diversity within law school student bodies and to deter-
mine relationships, if any, between personal characteristics and
humanistic orientation. While their data suggest some interesting con-
trasts in humanistic orientation, 6 the authors conclude that students
are a varied group, open to opportunities for humanistic growth, but
stifled by the narrowness of the range of experiences provided by legal
education and the law profession.
Shaffer and Redmount collected statements from law students
concerning their attitudes and feelings about themselves and law
school. They found that students are competitive and often inclined to
dominate and organize the lives of other people. But these attitudes
were often, if not invariably, accompanied by a concern for justice and
an altruistic desire to use developing skills to help others. The authors
note the emphasis on LSAT scores and undergraduate class rank in
admissions policies, yet they conclude that reform in law school admis-
sions toward "value-centered admissions will not change law-school
15. T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUhT, supra note 1, at Tables 18-27 supp. The authors state that
they "were struck by the uniformity of results among law students at every stage of legal educa-
tion, among practitioners, and among teachers." Id. at 116-17.
16. For example, students with relatively high undergraduate class rankings tended to be
more "problem" centered while students with relatively low undergraduate class rankings tended
to be "person" centered. Students with relatively low LSAT scores tended to be "problem" cen-
tered while students with relatively high LSAT scores tended to be "person" centered. Id. at 143-
44; id. at Tables 18-27 supp.
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climates. because it is clear that law students admitted in the tradi-
tional way already have more humanism than legal education can put
to use."17 It is possible, however, that many teachers and others who
are troubled by what they perceive as a predisposition toward narrow
thinking in students admitted through the traditional process18 will not
be persuaded that value-centered admissions policies will not improve
law school climates.
The authors' conclusions would have been more convincing if they
had undertaken research comparisons between their law student popu-
lation and non-law student groups. Each additional group could be
composed of subjects with characteristics suggesting that they were ca-
pable of graduating from law school. One group could be composed of
applicants denied admission to law school (it has become common-
place to observe that the number of qualified law school applicants far
exceeds the number that can be admitted). Another group could be
made up of individuals with no expressed desire to go to law school
although they are qualified to do so. Comparisons in humanistic orien-
tation between these groups would be most interesting. If levels of hu-
manistic orientation in non-law student groups were roughly the same
as the law student group, this data would tend to verify Shaffer and
Redmount's contention that the failure of legal education to produce
sufficiently humanistic lawyers is not significantly attributable to tradi-
tional law school admissions policies. If, on the other hand, humanistic
orientation among the nonstudent groups were appreciably higher, this
might suggest a present need for reform in admissions to achieve goals
of humanistic orientation. An even more fundamental reevaluation of
the problem would be required in the event that only the nonapplicant
group indicated higher levels of humanistic orientation. Moreover, ad-
mitting more humanistic students would increase the chances of pro-
ducing more humanistic lawyers if, as the authors conclude, humanistic
orientation is not diminished by the law school experience.
The book suggests that the authors might answer the criticism ex-
pressed above by challenging the underlying premise. Law students
are perceived by their teachers as narrow and unimaginative because
law teachers are unaware of what their students would be capable of if
the classroom and school climate were more conducive to learning.
The authors' "law-school climate," that is, sterile classroom experiences
and the absence of support or stimulation in a larger setting, causes
17. Id. at 194.
18. See Frierson, And the C Students Make the Money, 59 A.B.A.J. 61 (1973).
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students to conceal their feeling, concern, and commitment from their
teachers, and often from themselves. Yet, it is the feeling, concern, and
commitment of the students that makes learning exciting to both stu-
dent and teacher.
3. Opportunities for Humanistic Learning Are Lost Through Failures
of Law Teaching and Failures of Law Schools to Provide a
Climatefor Humanistic Learning
This portion of the book represents a significant contribution to the
literature. The authors and their staff conducted research on law teach-
ing by questioning students about their classroom experiences. They
also observed law school classes taught at the three schools in their
Indiana test group and observed tapes of classes taught at a fourth law
school. From their observations, the authors developed three types of
teaching style:
(a) The accepting style, in which the teacher takes his cue from stu-
dent interest and development. He accepts feelings and ideas,
encourages, and praises. Educational theory might associate
this teaching style with John Dewey; psychological theory
- would associate it with modem humanistic psychologists-Carl
Rogers, for example.
(b) The probing style, which emphasizes interrogation and criti-
cism, and which legal education has built up from the Langdeil
case method. The teacher asks questions, gives directions, criti-
cizes, and justifies his own authority.
(c) The lecture, in which the teacher gives facts or opinions about
content and procedure; expresses his own ideas; and asks rhetori-
cal questions. 19
The authors concluded from their research that the vast majority
of law school teaching is done by lecture and that the "Socratic
method" (closely associated with the authors' "probing style") is sel-
dom used. They further concluded that teachers infrequently adopt an
"accepting style." Most observers would probably agree with the view
of Shaffer and Redmount that a lecturing approach leaves students
bored and passive and tends to result in examination-oriented learning.
Partial transcripts of some observed classes are printed in the book
followed by the authors' critiques concerning the style and effectiveness
of the teaching. Regrettably, the book makes no effort to correlate stu-
dent opinions about teaching with classes observed by the authors and
their staff. The reluctance of law teachers to be observed is noted in the
19. T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOuNT, supra note 1, at 165.
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book, and perhaps even the more cooperative teachers would not have
permitted their students to be interviewed after their classes had been
observed.
Shaffer and Redmount advocate the use of the accepting style of
teaching. They suggest that to a large degree the teacher decides what
is important in the course, not only through the learning materials he
or she chooses to assign, but by the importance or approval that the
teacher attaches to types of student participation during the class. If
students feel that the more intimate aspects of their personality-their
feelings, values, and commitments about the learning material-are ir-
relevant or inappropriate to class work, they will not risk exposing
them. The authors are persuasive in urging that students who take such
risks learn more and are more likely to take them if the teacher gener-
ates an accepting atmosphere.
The book suggests that humanistic learning in law school will be
accomplished only if one looks beyond the style and quality of teaching
to the "law school climate." By this, the authors seem to mean virtually
anything that could affect the breadth and congeniality of learning
from the placement of student lockers to faculty tenure policy. Shaffer
and Redmount propose several strategies for establishing a humanistic
climate. Schools should provide support and direction for their facul-
ties, as well as encouraging collaborative relationships between stu-
dents for learning in and outside of the classroom. The authors,
however, rely less on data here than elsewhere. This is noticeable pri-
marily because, by this point in the book, the authors have cultivated in
the reader a taste for something more than "poetic insight" to support
conclusions. For example, the authors' review of the aspirations of law
faculty and the pressures under which they work would have been
strengthened if developed with reference to statements from faculty
members similar to student statements used earlier in the book.
One finishes the book troubled, perhaps, by the degree of responsi-
bility the authors ask law schools to accept for the supposed lack of
humanistic orientation among practicing lawyers. The alienation and
distrust with which lawyers are popularly perceived in this country be-
gan before law schools played a significant role in lawyer training.20
20. Historian Perry Miller noted the indifference of American lawyers and judges to the
feelings of those involved in legal problems during the early nineteenth century, when "the law-
yers of the young Republic began to mobilize the forces of the Head against the anarchic impulses
of the American Heart.... ." P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 105 (1965). Evi-
dence of early discontent may appear from the observations of a traveller to Walpole, Massachu-
setts, in 1831, who saw the office of a lawyer "which had been sadly mangled and multilated by
1978]
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The authors criticize the pressures of professional accreditation groups
on the law school curriculum and criticize the distracting effect that bar
examinations have on student attitudes about learning. Little is said,
however, about the professional pressures that might inhibit the law
school graduate's opportunities or inclinations for humanistic lawyer-
ing. Do the economics of the delivery of legal services make it difficult
for the law graduate to advance (to make money or to be promoted)
without exercising the power to control, manipulate, and abbreviate at-
torney-client relationships which is antithetical to humanistic lawyer-
ing? How effective will humanistic reform in legal education be until
we have a better idea of whether, or to what extent, there are real op-
portunities to practice humanistic law?
The book raises more questions than it tries to answer and will
stimulate the reader to ask even more. Though the response of my pro-
fessor friend indicates that resistance to criticism dies hard, this book
will be difficult to ignore. It is a remarkable and important book, less
because it will settle controversies over legal education than because it
creates a radical improvement in the quality of the dialogue. Of Amer-
ican legal education, Shaffer and Redmount note: "The principal moti-
vation for our study is that no one has systematically looked at this
process, even if one concedes its effectiveness"; Shaffer and Redmount
have realized their objective. Their book is also a work of considerable
conscience and one that is likely to spark disagreement. But responses
to this book-and one hopes that it will stimulate many-will undoubt-
edly be influenced by the framework it provides for perceiving legal
education and by the approach and example of its authors in seeking to
verify their conclusions.
having a cannon, charged with brick-bats, chain links, broken iron and earthen fired through it. It
was placed before the door and a slow match set it off, sending its miscellaneous contents com-
pletely through the tenement. The Lawyer had done something that gave offense to a couple of
miscreants who took this course to revenge their injury." C. FINNELLY, THE COUNTRY LAWYER
iN NEW ENOLAND 37 (1968).
